Executive Order on Election Integrity Has Minimal Impact on Illegal Student Data Use for Voter Registration and GOTV

March 25, 2025

Today, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order (EO) "Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections," a comprehensive directive aimed at strengthening election security through enhanced voter eligibility checks, uniform Election Day deadlines, and robust federal enforcement. Amid this shift, concerns linger about universities or groups like the ALL IN Campus Democracy Challenge illegally using student data—potentially violating FERPA—to target specific students for voter registration and GOTV campaigns. Does this EO clamp down on such practices? The short answer: not really. Its impact here is minimal. Here’s why, backed by the EO’s text and legal analysis.

The Context: ALL IN and Student Data Concerns

The ALL IN Campus Democracy Challenge is a nonpartisan initiative engaging over 950 colleges and universities to boost student civic participation. It supports voter registration, education, and turnout efforts. However, some critics speculate that universities or ALL IN might misuse student data—like names, addresses, or enrollment status—to selectively target students for GOTV, potentially breaching FERPA. FERPA (20 U.S.C. § 1232g) protects student privacy by prohibiting the release of personally identifiable information (PII) without consent, except under narrow exceptions (e.g., directory information, if not opted out). Illegal data use could involve sharing PII with external GOTV groups to focus on, say, politically active demographics, without student permission.

The Executive Order in Brief

The EO, effective March 25, 2025, prioritizes:

• Documentary proof of citizenship for voter registration (Section 2, citing 52 U.S.C. 20508).

• A strict Election Day ballot receipt deadline (Section 7, citing 2 U.S.C. 7 and 3 U.S.C. 1).

• Federal enforcement against non-citizen voting and election crimes (Sections 2 and 5, citing 18 U.S.C. 611).

• Voting system upgrades for paper-based integrity (Section 4, citing 52 U.S.C. 21003).

While these measures tighten election rules, they don’t directly address illegal student data use or FERPA violations by universities or ALL IN. Let’s dig into the legal reasoning.

Legal Rationale: Why the Executive Order Impact is Minimal on Illegal Campus Election GOTV

1. No Explicit Focus on Student Data or FERPA

   
   

   The EO is silent on university data practices, FERPA (20 U.S.C. § 1232g), or the misuse of student information for GOTV. Its scope centers on voter eligibility verification, voting processes, and federal law enforcement—not campus-specific privacy violations. FERPA enforcement falls under the Department of Education, not the agencies tasked here (e.g., DOJ, DHS, EAC), and the EO doesn’t expand their jurisdiction to cover student data breaches.

   
   

2. Citizenship Verification Targets Registration, Not Data Sources

   
   

   Section 2 requires proof of citizenship (e.g., passports, REAL ID) for voter registration (52 U.S.C. 20508(b)(3)). This could indirectly spotlight ineligible registrations stemming from misused data, but it doesn’t regulate how universities or ALL IN obtain or share student info. If illegal data use occurs, it’s a FERPA issue (34 C.F.R. Part 99), not an EO violation. The Supreme Court has upheld federal registration standards (Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013)), but this EO doesn’t touch data privacy.

   
   

3. Election Crime Enforcement Doesn’t Zero In on Universities

   
   

   Section 5 directs the DOJ to pursue election crimes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. 611, 1015) and share information with states. If universities illegally shared student data leading to fraudulent registrations (e.g., non-citizens voting), this could trigger scrutiny. However, the EO focuses on voters and election officials, not educational institutions as data handlers. FERPA violations are civil, not criminal, and outside the EO’s cited statutes unless tied to broader fraud—an unlikely leap without evidence.

   
   

4. Funding Leverage Doesn’t Reach Campus Data Practices

   
   

   Section 4 allows the EAC to withhold funds from non-compliant states (52 U.S.C. 21145), but this applies to election administration, not university operations. While universities receive federal funds (e.g., Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1070), the EO doesn’t condition these on FERPA compliance or GOTV data use. ALL IN, a nonprofit, isn’t directly funded by EAC grants, further limiting leverage.

   
   

5. State Authority Over Elections Persists

   
   

   Under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, states manage election logistics, including voter outreach rules. The EO operates within federal law (e.g., NVRA, HAVA) but doesn’t preempt state oversight of university GOTV efforts. FERPA violations would be addressed via existing Education Department processes (see 34 C.F.R. § 99.67), not this EO’s framework.

   
   

Practical Implications for Illegal Data Use

The EO’s effects on illicit student data practices are tangential at best:

• Heightened Scrutiny Risk: Stricter voter roll checks (Section 2(b)) might expose registrations tied to illegal data sharing, prompting secondary FERPA investigations. Yet, this hinges on downstream enforcement, not the EO itself.

• No New Penalties: Universities or ALL IN violating FERPA face existing sanctions (e.g., loss of federal funding under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3)), unchanged by the EO.

• Operational Continuity: ALL IN’s GOTV efforts can proceed legally using consented or public data (e.g., voter rolls), unaffected by the EO’s focus.

  
  

Legal Precedent Reinforces Minimal Impact

Courts have upheld federal election authority within defined limits (Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)), but privacy laws like FERPA remain distinct. The EO’s reliance on statutes like 18 U.S.C. 611 (non-citizen voting) doesn’t extend to campus data misuse unless it directly facilitates election crimes—a high bar unaddressed here. FERPA enforcement cases (e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)) show it’s a standalone regime, not subsumed by election integrity measures.

Conclusion: Status Quo Holds, for Now

The March 25, 2025, EO is a forceful push for election security, but it largely sidesteps the illegal use of student data for voter registration and GOTV. Universities or ALL IN violating FERPA face risks under existing law—not this EO’s directives. The order’s focus on citizenship, deadlines, and fraud leaves campus data practices in the Education Department’s domain, not the DOJ’s crosshairs. For now, concerns about targeting students with illicit data remain a FERPA issue, not an EO battleground. Watch for agency implementation, but don’t expect a crackdown here.

Disclaimer: This reflects the EO’s text as of March 25, 2025, at 2:52 PM PDT, assuming no immediate regulatory shifts. FERPA violations depend on specific evidence, not addressed here.

Notes on Legal Citations

• 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (FERPA): Protects student PII, key to data misuse concerns.

• 52 U.S.C. 20508: Governs voter registration forms, tied to EO’s citizenship rules.

• 18 U.S.C. 611: Bars non-citizen voting, a DOJ focus but not linked to FERPA.

• Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council (2013): Affirms federal registration authority, not data privacy.

• Gonzaga University v. Doe (2002): Clarifies FERPA’s enforcement limits.